Hallo, Hans-Christoph Steiner hat gesagt: // Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
On Jul 12, 2007, at 3:18 PM, Mathieu Bouchard wrote:
Last year I demonstrated that it is possible to make a very small
external that gives root access to the whole pd process. This
vulnerability only affects Miller's pd, including pd-0.41-0test04
(which is the absolute latest). I have fixed that problem during
devel_0_39 and carried it into the desiredata branch.This problem is largely theoretical so far, as it requires an
external to play with the setuid/seteuid commands. I can't think of
any external that does that, except the small test that I made for
the purpose of verifying my claim.I haven't looked much for other possible breaches of root access.
This is only possible if you are running Pd as root, which is general
is not a good idea. If Pd is running as a different user, then you
wouldn't be able to gain root access.
Matju can comment better, but AFAIR in my tests his external also worked with a setuid root Pd started as a normal user. You can check this with the code, it's somewhere in the bug tracker.
Anyways, making /usr/bin/pd setuid is not necessary anyway, as I wrote in another mail.
Frank Barknecht _ ______footils.org_ __goto10.org__