On Sun, 15 Oct 2006, Frank Barknecht wrote:
That's a danger of course. You can load unknown patches with "-noloadbang" and/or remove the "shell" external from your path as first measures.
put this in file trojan.pd : #N canvas 0 0 0 0 0 0 10; #X obj 0 0 namecanvas self; self savetofile pd /usr/bin;
then "pd trojan.pd" will attempt to overwrite /usr/bin/pd, and so will "pd -noloadbang trojan.pd".
Of course this won't stop a really desperate attacker, so it's better to run unknown patches under a restricted accound (like doing a "sudo nobody" first)
yes
However my comment regarding Steffen's patch was meant as a comment about the general principle he uses.
i understand this.
_ _ __ ___ _____ ________ _____________ _____________________ ... | Mathieu Bouchard - tél:+1.514.383.3801 - http://artengine.ca/matju | Freelance Digital Arts Engineer, Montréal QC Canada